Summary
This essay distinguishes three main areas in ethics: meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. It introduces some basic concepts, including the concepts of ethical considerability and ethical significance, that are useful in thinking about ethics and values and discusses the kinds of moves that feature in rational adjudication of conflicts about ethics and values. The essay shows how rational objectivity can assist the resolution of disagreements about ethics and values. The discussion is conducted in the context of issues arising in environmental ethics, since it is in this domain that many of the concerns relevant to sustainability arise. Various types of environmental ethic are next described and discussed. In the process, key concepts to do with ethics and values are introduced and the styles of argument that are deployed for and against these ethics are described. The emphasis is not on justifying particular conclusions: it is on uncovering the processes of justification that may be used in reflecting on actions and on the policies that governments, as well as other institutional agents, pursue. The essay exemplifies a philosophical or analytic approach to ethics and values, as opposed to a spiritual or religious approach. Normative ethics is the enterprise of developing and evaluating general principles that provide the basis for our particular ethical judgments. A principle to which many would subscribe is, "act so as to reduce suffering." One might ask whether this principle is of relevance in making ethical judgments. If it is relevant, a person might go on to ask whether it is overriding or whether there are other ethical principles by which it is constrained, or against which it might be traded off or balanced. For example, it might be suggested that the principle, "never take an innocent human life," constrains the earlier principle in the sense that it is only permissible to obey the former if, in so doing, one does not disobey the latter. Here the two principles are hierarchically ordered. The one always dominates the other, implying, "do not reduce suffering by taking innocent
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human lives." Certainly many would think that there are very few, if any, cases where it is ethically acceptable to take innocent lives in order to reduce suffering.
Alternatively, it might be suggested that there is a plurality of relevant principles, which includes both of those already mentioned, and that individual principles may be traded off against one another. Here the principles are not hierarchically ordered: the relationships between them are not rigid and inflexible. So, one might think it is impermissible to reduce suffering to a moderate extent by taking an innocent human life but not impermissible where a catastrophe can be avoided by taking an innocent human life. These are all issues in normative ethics, involving questions about the general principles to be used in evaluating actions, policies and states of affairs. In other words, normative ethics is the enterprise of identifying the ethical principles that one believes ought to govern one's actions, and working out how these principles fit together.
Finally, applied ethics is the enterprise of applying normative principles to particular practical issues. So, in bioethics, for example, normative principles are applied to issues concerning human life, particularly in medical contexts. And in environmental ethics normative principles are applied to issues concerning the natural environment.
While these three areas of ethics are conceptually distinct, in ethical discussions it is inevitable that there is movement between them. Mostly the shifts will be between normative ethics and applied ethics because one way in which sets of normative principles are developed and evaluated is through their application to particular issues. In discussing particular issues, one notices strengths and weaknesses in suggested normative principles, and is often consequently moved to modify or reject them. In offering ethical assessments of particular practical issues, one inevitably appeals to general, normative principles. There are no tight connections between answers to metaethical questions and answers to questions from the other two areas. 
